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Abstract
This study provides evidence that abnormal returns around bad news management
earnings forecasts and abnormal returns during subsequent periods are negatively correlated.
Most of the stock price reaction to bad news management forecasts of annual earnings is
reversed in the 60 days following the forecast. A significant amount of the cumulative abnormal
returns around bad news forecasts of quarterly earnings is reversed in the market's reaction to
the following quarterly earnings announcement. This evidence suggests that the market
overreacts to the management bad news earnings forecast. Unlike some of the previous
overreaction evidence, this study is not subject to the criticisms of beta shifts, cross-firm
comparisons, or lengthy intertemporal comparisons. In addition, the results are robust to
including many additional variables that could be hypothesized to affect the observed results.
^\
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Evidence Regarding the Stock Market's Overreaction
to Management Earnings Forecasts
I Introduction
Recently there have been numerous issues raised reg£U"ciing the adequacy of the
Efficient Market Hypothesis (hereafter, EMH) as a vaUd description of the financial market
pricing process for equity securities. These issues have included evidence of overreaction to
earnings information (De Bondt and Thaler [1987]; 2^owin [1989; 1990]), evidence of
underreaction to earnings information (Bernard and Thomas [1989; 1990]; Foster, Olsen, and
ShevUn [1984]; Freeman and Tse [1989]; Mendenhall [1991]), evidence of the P/E effect (Basu
[1977]; Fairfield and Harris [1990]; Latane, Tuttle, and Jones [1969]), evidence of the size effect
(Cook and Rozeff [1984]), evidence of the January effect (Keim [1983]; Tinic and West [1984]),
evidence of the usefulness of fundamental analysis (Holthausen and Larcker [1991]; Ou and
Penman [1989a; 1989b]; Stober [1991]), as well as evidence of empirical regularities in stock
prices (Chari, Jagannathan, and Ofer [1988]; Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter [1992]; De Bondt
and Thaler [1985]; Jegadeesh [1991]; Fama and French [1988]; Poterba and Summers [1988]).
Until recently, this evidence on the empirical invalidity of the EMH was dismissed by many
academics. However, given the proliferation of evidence challenging market efficiency, many
financial theorists and empirical researchers now accept that the EMH may be somewhat
flawed.
This study adds to the body of knowledge regarding the adequacy of the EMH by
analyzing the extent to which the market overreacts or underreacts to management earnings
forecasts. If the market reacts efficiently to management forecasts, there should be no
systematic pattern in the returns after the management forecast event. However, a positive
relation between the abnormal returns surrounding the management earnings forecast and
subsequent abnormal returns would indicate an underreaction by the market to the forecast
issuance (a post-forecast announcement drift). The observation of a negative relation between
the abnormal returns surrounding the management forecast and subsequent abnormal returns
would indicate an overreaction.
This study uses management earnings forecasts to investigate whether the market
efficiently responds to pubUc information by examining the relation between abnormal returns at
the time of the forecast and later abnormal returns.^ In this study, OLS regression models,
similar to those employed by Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter [1992], are used to test the
relations between price reactions around the management earnings forecast and price reactions
in later periods. The subsequent return periods include 10, 30, and 60 trading days after the
forecast issuance as well as the subsequent earnings announcement.
Our results indicate four things. (1) No statistically significant price reversal or drift is
observed for good news annual earnings forecast firms. (2) There is a significant price reversal
observed after the bad news annual earnings forecasts. This observation is robust to the length
of the subsequent window employed (i.e., 10 day, 30 day, or 60 day window). However, the
price reversal is concentrated in the period between the forecast and the earnings announcement
since the price reaction for the later earnings announcement is not correlated with the price
reaction around the prior forecast. (3) A statistically significant negative relation is observed
between the price reaction around bad news forecasts of quarterly earnings and the price
reactions around subsequent quarterly earnings announcements. (4) Based on the observed
price reversals, it is plausible that one could have earned economically substantial excess returns
Accordingly, this study is not intended to test an investment strategy rule although there are direct
implications of our evidence for developing profitable trading strategies. Instead, we intend to provide evidence
regarding the extent to which the market reacts inefficiently to management forecasts.
In instances in which the subsequent earnings announcement occurs before the end of the 10, 30, or 60 day
window, we constrain the return to be that occurring up to the earnings announcement.
We do not study the association between the forecast announcement abnormal returns and those of
subsequent periods (i.e., 10, 30, or 60 day periods) since the quarterly forecasts tend to be issued close to the quarterly
earnings announcement.
by buying the stock of extreme "losers" (bad news forecast firms) after the management forecast
has been issued. Overall, the evidence suggests that the market overreacts to bad news earnings
forecasts by management.
The next section discusses inefficiencies in the market's reaction to earnings
announcements and similar information events. In section three, we describe our research
design, data and variables. The results of the amalyses based on forecasts of annual earnings are
provided in section four. Section five contains the results of the analyses conducted on quarterly
forecasts. The final section provides implications and the conclusion of this study.
II Market Inefficiency Characterized by Over/Under Reactions to Earnings
Information
Ball and Brown [1968] document that, subsequent to the announcement of earnings,
CAR'S continue to drift up for "good news" firms and down for "bad news" firms. Bernard and
Thomas [1989] seek to discriminate between two alternative explanations for post-earnings-
announcement drift: a failure to adjust abnormal returns fully for risk, and a delay in the
response to the earnings report. They conclude that much of their evidence cannot plausibly be
reconciled with arguments built on risk measurement but their evidence is consistent with a
delayed price response. In particular, a significant amount of the post-announcement drift
occurs on the date of the subsequent earnings announcement.
Recently, another line of research documents the phenomenon of "overreaction".
De Bondt and Thaler [1985; 1987] show that firms with prior extreme negative stock price
performance, or the "losers", outperform the market in the later periods. Likewise, firms with
prior extreme positive stock price performance, "winners", underperform the market in the later
*
This phenomenon is also documented in at least 20 other studies.
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periods. De Bondt and Thaler [1987] hypothesize that the reason for this phenomenon is the
market's inefficient response (overreaction) to earnings information.
Whether the De Bondt and Thaler evidence should be interpreted as evidence of
overreaction to earnings announcements is still a subject of debate. First, Bernard [1992] points
out that the overreaction, as studied by De Bondt and Thaler, cannot be characterized as an
overreaction to earnings, per se. A predictable reversal of prior period extreme price movement
is consistent with a variety of market inefficiencies—including random deviations of price from
fundamental values—and need not be caused by any systematic misinterpretation of earnings
information. Second, the "losers" and "winners" are different firms, and stock returns are
compared across periods that may be significantly different. Consequently, differential firm
characteristics (e.g., firm size) as well as confounding time effects (e.g., risk changes) may be
driving the documented effect.
Zarowin [1989; 1990], controlling for the size effect, tests the overreaction hypothesis.
As noted by De Bondt and Thaler [1987], the losers are normally small firms. Zarowin matches
losers with winners of equal size and finds little evidence of differential performance. This
result suggests that the superior performance of losers relative to winners is not due to investor
overreaction, but instead is a manifestation of the size effect since the losers tend to be small
firms while the winners are large.
Chan [1988], and Ball and Kothari [1989] argue that the empirical evidence of return
reversals can largely be attributed to uncontrolled risk changes. Since the equity beta of a firm
is a function of both the firm's asset risk and its capital structure, the loser"s (winner's) equity
beta will increase (decrease) due to a series of negative (positive) abnormal returns.
Consequently, the losers will have higher betas and, therefore, higher expected returns than the
winners. The evidence provided by Bail and Kothari [1989] shows that the betas of losers are
much higher (a difference of .76 in an extreme case) than those of winners following the
portfolio formation period. They contend that the large beta difference is likely to account for
substantial differences in realized returns.
The above arguments suggest that the inferences in the overreaction studies may be
more problematic than those found in imderreaction studies. Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter
[1992] argue that the methodologies employed by Zarowin and by Ball and Kothari are biased
toward attributing differential retiu^ns to size and beta adjustments. They find that De Bondt
and Thaler's results remain significant even after adjusting for size and risk effects. Chopra,
Lakonishok, and Ritter attempt to reconcile the stock return overreaction evidence with the
earnings announcement underreaction evidence. They show that part (about 20 percent) of the
superior performance of losers over winners is concentrated within the three day intervals
surrounding earnings announcements in the later periods. Moreover, their results are robust to
both the size effect and risk change arguments. Their evidence is consistent with the De Bondt
and Thaler conjecture of an overreaction to earnings atmouncements.
The existence of both overreaction and underreaction phenomena in financial markets
that have been considered efficient is difficult to reconcile. Bernard [1991] offers four possible
explanations to resolve this controversy. (1) The overreaction cannot be characterized as an
overreaction to earnings per se as described above. (2) Both underreactions to earnings and
overreactions to earnings occur. Specifically, stock prices could underreact, on average, to
earnings, while overreactions occur only under conditions too complex to be captured by a
simple partition on prior periods earnings changes. (3) The market's response to earnings
announcements defies a simple characterization as underreaction or overreaction. (4) Research
design flaws cause the observed "underreaction" and "overreaction" phenomena.
Nevertheless, if the market efficiently reflects the public information contained in an
announcement, the stock price movement in the subsequent period should not be a systematic
function of the previous price reactions (e.g., around prior management forecasts). This study
intends to investigate the overreaction and underreaction phenomena using the management
earnings forecast event.
Previous research regarding the overreaction and underreaction phenomena has been
criticized on methodological grounds. The use of management forecasts to study this topic has
three prominent advantages over informative events studied in previous research, (1) The
subsequent issuance of earnings announcements is the realization of the prior information.
Consequently, this study provides direct tests of both the underreaction and the overreaction
hypotheses, (2) The forecast and subsequent earnings announcements are issued within one
year or less for ihe annual earnings forecasts and within a few days for the quarterly earnings
forecasts. Therefore, risk changes should be minimal over such a short period. Accordingly, the
risk change argument for observing a reaction is not valid. (3) The research design focuses on
the price reactions for the same firm across different periods. Consequently, the size effect will
not be problematic,
III Research Design, Data, and Variables
This section describes the research design, data sources, and variables used to conduct
our analyses. The underlying motive for these tests is to determine whether the stock market
efficiently responds to the information in management annual and quarterly earnings forecasts.
If the market underreacts, a positive correlation between the abnormal returns around the
management forecast (CARM) and the abnormal returns during later periods (including the
subsequent earnings announcement) is expected. On the other hand, if the market overreacts, a
negative correlation between the abnormal returns around the management forecast and the
abnormal returns during the following periods is expected to be observed.
This study examines both management forecasts of annual earnings and management forecasts of quarterly
earnings.
In addition, many other information environment factors are controlled smce the firms issuing forecasts are
generally large NYSE or AMEX firms (e.g. Cox [1985]).
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In this study, the four-day (days -2 to + 1) cumulative (or average) abnormal return is
used to measure the price reaction to the management forecast. The subsequent periods
employed include the next 10 trading days (days +2 to +11), the subsequent 30 trading days
(days +2 to +31), and the subsequent 60 trading days (days +2 to +61) after the management
ft
forecast event periods (but before the subsequent earnings announcement). In addition, the
four-day cumulative abnormal return around the following earnings announcement (CARE) is
also employed.
The analysis is conducted using a regression approach similar to the approach employed
by Chopra, Lakonishok, and Ritter [1992]. We run analyses using both average abnormal
returns (AVAR) and cumulative abnormal returns (CAR). The basic regression analyses are as
follows:
AVAR(t)i = Yo + Yi AVARMj + e (1)
CAREj = Yo + Yi CARMj + e (2)
where: Yq ^^^ Y^- OluS regression coefficients;
AVAR(t)i: the average abnormal return during the subsequent t
trading day return after the management forecast for firm i;
AVARMji the average four-day abnormal return around the
management forecast for firm i;
CARMj: the cumulative abnormal return around the management
forecast for firm i;
^ We chcxjse to include the day after the forecast issuance (day + 1) in the event that our forecast date is
imprecise since discrepancies exist between the Wail Street Journal Index and Dow Jones News Retrieval regarding the
date of the forecast issuance. A priori, there is no reason to expect that the inclusion of day + 1 would bias our results.
All the sample firms have at least 10 daily return data in the subsequent period. Firms which have less than
20 (45) daily return data due to the overlap with the subsequent earnings announcement event period are excluded
from the 30 (60) day regression analyses.
CAREj: the cumulative abnormal return around the earnings
announcement for firm i;
e: the regression error term.
To avoid difficulties in modeling the expectations of the market regarding the forecasted
earnings and determining whether the forecast is good or bad news, we classify firms that have
positive (negative) abnormal returns (CARM) for the management forecast event as good news
(bad news) firms or the winners (losers). Based on the regression results, we examine the
returns for a trading strategy that buys securities immediately after the management forecast
event period and holds them for 60 days (days +2 to +61), or until the following earnings
announcement date, whichever one is shorter. This allows us to determine whether there is
differential performance for the following five portfolios of firms: (1) the complete sample of
firms; (2) the winners (firms experiencing positive returns for the management forecast event);
(3) the losers (firms experiencing negative returns for the management forecast event); (4) the
extreme winners (CARM greater than
.05); and (5) the extreme losers (CARM less than -.05).
The abnormal returns are estimated using a market model approach. Each firm's
market model estimation period consists of 400 observations. They are the 200 consecutive daily
observations preceding the start of the management forecast event window (days M-202 to M-3,
where M is the day of the management forecast) and the 200 consecutive daily observations
beginning two days after the actual earnings aimouncement after the forecast (days E + 2 to
E + 201, where E is the day of the earnings announcement). In instances in which there are not
We examine the sensitivity of our results based on quarterly forecasts to this method of identifying good and
bad news firms by using the difference between the management forecast and the previous median analyst forecast.
Our results are very similar.
We have examined the sensitivity of some of our results to using excess returns (from the CRSP excess
returns tape) rather than abnormal returns from a market model approach. Our results and inferences are robust
across both measures. In addition, we examined the sensitivity of our results to using market model parameters
estimated using the 200 days prior to the management forecast, the 200 days subsequent to the earnings announcement,
and both periods. The results are insensitive to the choice among these three estimation periods. This suggests that
beta shifts are not driving our results.
8
400 observations available, the estimation is based on at least 200 observations during the period
defined above.
In the following diagram, the intervals [M-202, M-3] and [E + 2, E + 201] represent the
estimation period, and the intervals [M-2, M + 1] and [E-2, E + 1] represent the four day event
windows for the management forecast and the earnings announcement events, respectively.
Management Earnings
Forecast Announcement
—\ I I \ \ \ I \ I \
M-202 M-3 M-2 M M+1 E-2 E E+1 E+2 E+201
The sample of fu-ms that have a management forecast of earnings is the same sample
employed by Yeo [1990]. The sample was collected using the Dow Jones News Retrieval
Service and consists of management forecasts issued during the January, 1981 to December,
1987 period. The following sample selection criteria were employed:
1. The firms must be included on the Compustat Annual Industrial and CRSP
Daily Return files. Compustat industry codes are between 0100 and 3999 or
between 5000 and 5999.
2. A point forecast of earnings per share must be provided in the management
forecast or can be readily estimated from the disclosure.
3. The management forecast must be attributed to a company official.
4. The management forecast must be disclosed at least one month before the
actual earnings announcement date.
In addition, firms must have at least 200 daily returns during the estimation period defined
above; firms with less than 200 are not included in the sample. The resulting fmal sample, on
which we conduct our analyses, contains 180 forecast instances. This sample includes 87 firms
that we define as bad news firms (losers) since they have a negative CARM in response to the
management forecast. The remaining 93 firms are defined as good news firms (the winners)
since there is a positive price response to the management forecast. The subsequent earnings
annoimcement date is collected from either the Compustat Quarterly file or the Wall Street
Journal Index.
The regression analyses in this section, equations (1) and (2), are employed to test the
following two hypotheses (presented in null form):
Hj: There is no relation between the abnormal return around the management
forecast and the abnormal return in the subsequent period prior to the next
earnings announcement.
H2: There is no relation between the cumulative abnormal return around the
management forecast and the cumulative abnormal return for the following
earnings announcement.
A positive estimate for y^ in equation (1) or (2) suggests that the market underreacts to the
information in the management forecasts since the abnormal returns continue to drift upwjird
(downward) for the good news (bad news) firms. The observation of a negative estimate for Yi
in equation (1) or (2) indicates that the market overreacts to the information in the management
forecasts since the abnormal returns drift downward (upward) for the good news (bad news)
firms. We also will consider the stock performance in the subsequent period and test the
following hypothesis:
H3: The stock performance (abnormal returns) of good news (winners) and
bad news (losers) subsequent to the issuance of management forecasts is equal
to zero.
The test of this hypothesis is used to further assess the economic impact of the overreaction or
underreaction phenomena.
IV Results Based on Forecasts of Annual Earnings
The results of our empirical analyses, based on management's forecasts of annual
earnings, are described in this section. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics for the
variables and the correlation among the variables for the bad news and good news forecast
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firms, respectively.^^ For the good news forecast firms (Panel B), no significant correlation is
observed between the market reaction at the management forecast (CARM) and any of the
subsequent period returns (AVAR(IO), AVAR(30), AVAR(60), and CARE). This suggests
there is neither an underreaction nor an overreaction to the good news management forecasts of
annual earnings.
Insert Table 1
For the bad news forecast firms, there is evidence of a relation between the reaction at
the time of the management forecast and later returns. Although there is not a statistically
significant relation between the market reaction to the management forecast (CARM) and the
market reaction to the following earnings announcement (CARE) for the bad news firms, there
is a statistically significant negative relation between the market reaction to the management
forecast (CARM) and the abnormal returns in the subsequent 10, 30, and 60 trading day periods
(AVAR(IO), AVAR(30), and AVAR(60)).^^ The correlations between CARM and
AVAR(IO), AVAR(30), and AVAR(60) are -.260, -.270 and -.365. They are significant at the
'
' To ensure that the observed abnormal returns are not due to bid/ask effects we provide the following
evidence. The mean stock price for all firms is $38.33 with a standard deviation of 22.94. The minimum price is $2,625
with a maximum price of $228.50. Given that the stock prices are not small, one would expect the bid/ask effect to be
minimal. The mean stock price for the bad news firms is $36.89 while it is $39.66 for the good news firms. For the
extreme bad news firms the mean stock price is $26.76. The mean stock price is $40.35 for the extreme good news
firms.
'^ In order to examine whether our results are due to the coefficient estimates for the market models we
provide the following information regarding our estimates.
For the 93 good news firms, the mean intercept is .00028 (t-value of 2.60 for testing the null that the
intercept is 0.0) and the mean beta is 1.0296 (t-value of 0.75 for testing the null that beta equals 1.00). There are 27
instances in which the absolute value of the intercept is greater than zero by a value of .001 or larger. Beta is greater
than UO or less than _50 for 13 of the good news firms' market models.
For the 87 bad news firms, the mean intercept is .00013 (t-value of 1.28 for testing the null that the intercept
is 0.0) and the mean beta is .923 (t-value of -1.90 for testing the null that beta equals 1.00). There are 21 instances in
which the difference between the absolute value of the intercept and zero is equal to or greater than .001. Beta is
greater than UO or less than -50 for 16 of the bad news firms' market models.
When the observations for the bad news firms with extreme values for the intercept or beta are eliminated
from the sample, the results obtained are similar although slightly weaker. The results of additional regressions in
which the subsequent period abnormal returns (10, 30, and 60 trading day periods) arc regressed on the abnormal
return at the time of the forecast and the intercept and beta (from the market model) indicate that the abnormal
return in the subsequent 60 trading day period is associated with the intercept estimate but not the beta estimate.
Although the inclusion of the intercept is statistically significant for the 60 trading day subsequent period, the
regression coefficient for the abnormal returns during the forecast event remains statistically significant. These results
are available from the authors upon request.
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.02 .02, and .01 levels respectively. This evidence suggests that the market inefficiently reacts
to the issuance of bad news forecasts yet efficiently reacts to the good news forecasts. The
inefficient reaction to the bad news forecasts is manifested in an overreaction.
Figure 1 provides a graph of the abnormal returns for five periods for both the good
news cind the bad news groups of firms. The patterns suggest that both the good news and the
bad news groups reverse the initial reaction to the management forecast.
Insert Figure 1
Figures 2 and 3 provide a graph of the mean abnormal returns similar to those in
Figure 1 except the securities are placed in five portfolios based on the magnitude of the
abnormal return at the management forecast. For the bad news firms, Figure 2 suggests that it
is the two quintiles with the largest reaction to the management forecast that demonstrate the
reversal in the subsequent periods. It is only these two quintiles which have a positive abnormal
return in the later periods.
Insert Figure 2
In Figure 3, the mean abnormal returns for the five periods are plotted for the good
news forecast firms. The results are mixed and indicate that some reversal does occur but that
it is not systematic across the alternative windows.
Insert Figure 3
The regression results are provided in Tables 2 and 3. For bad news firms, the results
reported in Table 2, Panel A depict a significant relation between the observed reaction to the
management forecast (AVARM) and the abnormal returns in the subsequent period. The
regression coefficients for the 10 day, 30 day, and 60 day period are -.150, -.082, and -.076,
respectively. They are statistically significant at the .05, .05, and .01 levels. The adjusted R^'s
The three Spearman rank-order correlations are -.204, -.138, and -.278, respectively. They are significant at
the .05, .20, and .02 levels. Consequently, the statistically significant negative product-moment correlations are not
likely to be driven by a few extreme observations.
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for the three regression equations are .0567, .0620, and .1217, and the three intercept estimates
are not significantly different from zero. The results provided in Table 3, Panel A indicate that
the regression coefficient Unking the following earnings announcement reaction to the
management forecast reaction is .026. It is not statistically different from zero.
Insert Tables 2 and 3
For good news firms, no significant result is observed; this is expected given the
correlations reported in Table 1. In Table 2, Panel B, the regression coefficients linking the
returns in the following periods to the market reaction for the management forecast are
statistically insignificant across all three event windows (10 days, 30 days, and 60 days). In
addition, the results in Table 3, Panel B, report an insignificant coefficient between the market
reaction at the time of the mzmagement forecast and the market reaction at the time of the
following earnings announcement.
In summary, these results suggest that the price reactions in the post-forecast periods
are negatively correlated with the price reactions to the management forecasts for the bad news
forecast firms. This evidence is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis since the reaction to
the management forecast is reversed. Although consistent with the market overreacting, this
evidence on the reaction to management forecasts is contradictory to the "post-announcement-
drift" (underreaction) phenomenon observed for earnings announcements.
We investigate the post-forecast stock performance of various portfolios using abnormal
returns computed as previously described. The five portfolios analyzed include (1) all firms in
our sample, (2) the bad news firms, (3) the good news firms, (4) extreme good news firms
(CARM >.05), and (5) extreme bad news firms (CARM < -.05). The period of analysis
consists of the 60 days after the forecast event period or the period between the forecast event
and the following earnings announcement, whichever is shorter. These results are presented in
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Table 4.^'* In general, the bad (good) news fu-ms have positive (negative) average abnormal
returns in the later period. Although both the positive and negative abnormal returns for
the bad news and good news portfoUos are not significantly different from zero, the results in
Table 4 do suggest that the portfoUo of extreme bad news firms (losers) are statistically different
than zero. The extreme losers experience significant positive abnormal returns during the 60
days cifter the management forecast. During this 60 day period, the average single day abnormal
return for the 24 extreme losers is .00121. This abnormal return is substantial, about 30 percent,
annualized. The t-statistic for the average abnormal return is 2.139 and is significant at the .05
level. This result reveals that the overreaction to the management forecast for the extreme bad
news management forecasts is not only statistically significant but is also economically
significant.
Insert Table 4
V Results Based on Forecasts of Quarterly Earnings
In the previous section, we provide the results of our analysis focusing on management
forecasts of annual earnings. In this section, we report the results of our analysis focusing on
'* Since the regression results suggest that the price reversal does not happen in the subsequent earnings
announcement period, the 60 days subsequent period employed will not include the earnings announcement period.
'*
It should be noted that the overreaction phenomenon is not observed for good news firms using the
regression approach for the analysis. Consequently, although we observe a marginally significant reversal for the good
new firms, we have no explanation for this result.
'^ We do not pool the standard errors and test whether the excess returns are different across the two
portfolios in the subsequent period for good and bad news firms since the pooling of standard errors may be
problematic.
In order to determine the extent to which non-normality in the distributions of the abnormal returns for the
extreme bad news portfolios affects our inferences, we employ computer intensive resampling techniques to empirically
generate sampling distributions for our statistics. From the sample of bad news firms, we chose the 30 firms with the
largest negative abnormal returns at the time of the management forecast, we randomly choose 15 firms and compute
the cumulative abnormal return for the 10 day, 30 day, 60 day, and subsequent earnings announcement period. This
was repeated for 10000 trials. For the 10 day period, the mean cumulative abnormal return is between .02 and .025
with 91.4% of the distribution being greater than zero. The mean cumulative abnormal return for the 30 day window is
also between .02 and .025 with 79.6% of the distribution being greater than zero. The 60 day period has a mean
cumulative abnormal return of between .055 and .06 with 93.8% of the distribution greater than zero.
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management forecasts of quarterly earnings. We extend our analysis to quarterly earnings
forecasts to determine the extent to which the results are similar to those for annual earnings
forecasts. Since the length of time between the forecast issuance and the earnings
announcement is short, we expect fewer extraneous information events to have occurred in the
interim and this allows us to analyze the extent to which the reaction to the forecast is reversed
in the reaction to the earnings announcement. Given our results for annual earnings forecasts,
we focus on the overreaction of the market to bad news management forecasts.
Since the period between quarterly forecasts and following earnings announcements is
very short, we only employ two periods for our analyses. They are (1) a four day event window
surrounding the subsequent quarterly earnings announcement, and (2) the period between the
forecast event window and the quarterly earnings announcement event window. The number of
days included in the second period of analysis varies since the number of days between the
forecast and the earnings announcement differs significantly across firms. The mean and
median number of trading days between the quarterly earnings forecast by management and the
following earning announcement in our sample is 18.83 and 14, respectively.
The sample of management forecasts of quarterly earnings is from Liu [1992]. The
sample contains 78 bad news forecasts for the period between October 1983 and December
1986. The sample selection criteria are the same as those used for the annual earnings forecasts
except for the first and fifth criteria. We relax the criteria regarding the industries included and
do not require the forecast to be issued more than a month before the following earnings
announcement. Quarterly forecasts for the fourth quarter are not included in the analysis to
avoid any confounding effects with annual forecasts. An analysis of potential confounding events
listed in the Wall Street Journal Index during the period between the management forecast and
the earnings announcement indicates that 42 out of the 78 had no events listed while 21 had one
Consistent with the results for good news annual earnings forecasts, we tested good news forecasts of
quarterly earnings and observed statistically insignificant price reversals.
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event. ^^ Each news event was anzdyzed to determine if any event would be expected to
significantly impact the market or to systematically impact our results.
The two basic regression models employed for this analysis are described below.
AVARFEj = Yo + Yi AVARMj + € (3)
CAREj = Yo + Yi CARMj + € (4)
where: AVARFEji average daily abnormal return in the period between the
forecast event period and the earnings aimouncement event for
firm i;
Yo and Yi: OLS regression coefficients;
The other variables are as described previously.
Equation (3) is the same cis equation (1) used in the annual earnings forecast analysis except
that the subsequent window is defined differently. Equation (4) is the same as equation (2)
described previously.
Descriptive statistics and product-moment correlations for the variables are presented in
Table 5. In addition, the ex-post forecast error, included in the analysis (equation (5) which
is discussed later) to control for the surprise in the earnings announcement is also provided.
The abnormal returns surrounding the management forecast, CARM, and the average daily
abnormal return during the period between the management forecast and the quarterly earnings
aimouncement, AVTE, are not significantly correlated. This contrasts with the results based on
annual earnings forecasts reported above. However, the correlation between abnormal returns
surrounding the management forecast, CARM, and abnormal returns surrounding the quarterly
The remaining 15 had the following numbers of news events during the period between the management
forecast and the earnings announcement: 2 news events - 6 firms; 3 news events - 3 firms; 4 news events - 1 firm; 5
news events - 1 firm; 6 news events - 3 firms; and 1 firm had 23 news events.
A Usting of our sample firms (for the quarterly forecasts) and the news events between the management
forecast and the earnings announcement is available from the authors upon request.
The mean stock price is $31.59 with a standard deviation of 16.24. The minimum stock price is $3,625 while
the maximum is $102.75. Stock prices at these levels suggest that our results are not being driven by the bid/ask
spread effect.
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earnings announcement, CARE, is -.267 and is statistically significant at the .02 level. This
significant correlation, although different from that observed for the annual earnings analysis,
supports the overreaction hypothesis.
Insert Table 5
A plausible explanation for the difference in results between the annual earnings
forecasts and the quarterly earnings forecasts exists. For the firms in our sample, the mean
number of trading days between the issuance of the annual earnings forecast and the actual
annual earnings announcement is 129, while the median is 123 trading days. Since annual
forecasts are issued many days before the earnings announcements, other information sources
may have already been incorporated in the security prices prior to the earnings aimouncements.
Consequently, the overreaction cannot be observed in the earnings announcement event period.
However, since the quarterly earnings forecasts and the quarterly earnings announcements are
closely issued, the extraneous information may be limited or the market may choose to wait until
the earnings information becomes certain before correcting the overreaction. Therefore, the
correction is observed at the time of the quarterly earnings announcement.
Table 5 also shows that the correlation between abnormal returns surrounding the
quarterly earnings announcement, CARE, and the surprise in the quarterly earnings
announcement, FE, is .229. As expected, this association is positive and is significant at the .05
level. This result suggests that the observed price reactions around the following quarterly
earnings announcement is a function of both the unexpected earnings and the correction of the
previous overreaction. The correlation between the abnormal returns surrounding the quarterly
earnings forecast, CARM, and the surprise in the quarterly earnings announcement, FE, will be
discussed later.
^^ The Spearman rank-order correlation is -.241 and is significant at the .04 level.
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The regression results for the two regression analyses (equations (3) and (4)) using
quarterly earnings forecasts by management are presented in Tables 6 and 7. In Table 6, the
reported coefficient estimate for equation (3), linking the average daily abnormal return during
the period between the management forecast and the following quarterly earnings
announcement (AVFE) to the average daily abnormal return surrounding the quarterly earnings
forecast (AVARM), is positive and insignificant. However, the coefficient estimate for equation
(4), reported in Table 7, which links the abnormal returns around the quarterly earnings
announcement to the abnormal returns around the management forecast is -.24. This coefficient
estimate is statistically significant at the .05 level. The adjusted R for equation (4) is .0588.
This evidence is consistent with the overreaction hypothesis and is contradictory to the
underreaction hypothesis. The noteworthy difference between the results for annual and
quarterly forecasts is that the price reversal of the overreaction is observed in different periods.
Insert Tables 6 and 7
We control for the unexpected earnings in the quarterly earnings announcement since
the observed price reaction around the earnings announcements should be a function of the
surprise component of the earnings announcement (unexpected earnings). In addition, it is
desirable to control for the unexpected earnings since one could contend that the observed price
reversal is due to good news in the quarterly announcement. The next regression analysis
incorporates the ex-post forecast error to control for the unexpected earnings. The model is
as follows:
Similar to the results using annual forecasts, no significant result is found for goods news forecasts of
quarterly earnings.
Since the quarterly earnings forecasts and earnings announcements are issued within a relatively short period
of time, we use the forecast error, the difference between the actual quarterly earnings and that forecasted by
management, to proxy for the unexpected earnings.
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II
CAREj = Yo + Yi CARMj + Y2 FEj + e (5)
where: FEj: difference between actual quarterly EPS and the forecasted
quarterly EPS deflated by the pre-forecast stock price.
The other variables are as previously defined.
Since McNichols [1989] has documented a positive correlation between the abnormal
return surrounding the management forecast, CARM, and the ex-post forecast error (FE), the
above regression model may suffer a multicoUinearity problem. We do not believe this to be
problematic since the simple correlation between FE and CARM is only .193.
The results of our analysis using equation (5) are presented in Table 8. The coefficient
estimates for CARM and FE are -.29 and 1.22, respectively. They are both statistically
significant at the .01 level and the adjusted R is .1303. After controlling for the unexpected
earnings, the regression coefficient for CARM is more significant and the evidence supporting
the overreaction phenomenon is more prominent.
Insert Table 8
The price reactions around the following quarterly earnings announcements are also
significantly correlated with the forecast error. This result suggests our use of the management
forecast error to proxy for the surprise in the quarterly earnings announcement is appropriate.
Consequently, the observed negative correlation between CARM and CARE is not likely to be
due to the surprise in the earnings announcement, proxied by FE.
^^ We also include the following variables in additional analyses to determine if they arc driving the observed
results: (1) beta; (2) firm size; (3) the number of analysts following the firm; and (4) the forecast dispersion (standard
deviation of previous analysts forecasts). The regression coefficients for all these variables are not statistically
significant and our results are robust to the inclusion of these additional variables. For an additional analysis of the
robustness of our results, we employ an alternative definition of a bad news forecasts. Instead of using the observed
market reaction to the management forecast to stratify the firms into good and bad news forecasts, we define bad news
forecast firms as those with a management forecast of quarterly EPS less than previous median of the analysts'
forecasts of quarterly EPS. The sample of bad news forecast firms identified using this approach is very similar to the
sample on which we base our results reported above; the results are basically the same and the inferences remain
unchanged. These results are not reported but can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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In this section, we consider the security performance in the period between two days
after the quarterly earnings forecast by management and the day before the quarterly earnings
announcement. The results are presented in Table 9.
Insert Table 9
Contrary to the results reported for the annual forecasts, we do not fmd a positive
average abnormal return for the bad news firms throughout this period. Instead, we observe a
negative average daily return for the sample of bad news firms. However, the extreme losers do
appear to have positive abnormal returns; although they are not statistically significant.
VI Implications and Conclusion
This study considers the relation between price reactions around management earnings
forecasts and price reactions in subsequent periods, including the following earnings
announcement. The Efficient Market Hypothesis predicts that one should not observe a
significant association between the abnormal returns around the forecast and abnormal returns
in the following periods (including the earnings announcement periods). However, this study
provides evidence that the abnormal returns around management bad news earnings forecasts
and the abnormal returns in subsequent periods are negatively correlated. This evidence is
consistent with the market overreacting to the management forecasts. More importantly, since
firms issuing forecasts and earnings announcements are the same firms, and ex-post forecast
errors are controlled, the evidence based on the quarterly forecasts clearly indicates that the
market overreacts to the management bad news earnings forecast. However, no statistically
significant price reversal is found for good news management earnings forecasts.
Previous studies (e.g., Waymire [1984] and McNichols [1989]) document that, for both
good and bad news forecasts, the specific information about the firm's future earnings is what
drives the price reaction to management forecasts. According to Ajinkya and Gift [1984],
managers have incentives to disclose bad news forecasts to avoid dramatic swings in stock price
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at the end of the period when actual earnings are announced. Thus, bad news forecasts
could be used as means of "inoculating" the market for the forthcoming bad news in the
earnings. Yeo [1990] finds some evidence to support the inoculation hypothesis. However,
investors may speculate that the real information that the managers have received (and not
reported) is even worse than the information revealed through the management earnings
forecasts. Therefore, the market could be overly pessimistic about the bad news management
earnings forecast, and that results in the overreaction.
Although both overreaction and underreaction phenomena have been documented in
the literature, the two phenomena are clearly contradictory to each another and to the Efficient
Market Hypothesis. However, previous overreaction studies are vulnerable to the different firm
characteristics (e.g., the size effect) and comparisons across different periods (e.g., the risk
change) arguments. On the other hand, this study does not suffer from these methodological
difficulties. The evidence in this study unambiguously indicates that the market overreacts to the
bad news management earnings forecasts and we find no evidence of the "post-announcements-
drift" phenomenon.
The results of this study also demonstrate that the quarterly forecast errors are
correlated not only with price reactions around the management forecast (McNichols [1989]) but
also with the price movements in the following earnings announcement period. This result
combined with the overreaction evidence shows that the market may only possess limited
information regarding ex-post forecast errors and is overly pessimistic in general about the bad
news management earnings forecast in the prior forecast event period.
The evidence in this study is clearly an anomaly to the Efficient Market Hypothesis.
Future studies should concentrate on investigating other information issues and providing
explanations for the overreaction phenomenon documented in this study.
^^ Other incentives to release a forecast include: (1) signaling a manager's ability (Trueman [1986]); (2)
reducing the unequal access to piivate information enjoyed by a subset of the stockholders (Lees [1981]); and (3)
preventing the firm from being erroneously perceived as a bad firm (Verrecchia [1983] and Dye [1985]).
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Figure 1 - Plot of Cumulative Abnormal Returns
for Management Forecasts - Good News and Bad News Groups
0. 01




Good News [^^^\!^ Bad News
60
= cumulative abnormal return during the -2 to +1 forecast event period
10 = cumulative abnormal return - 10 trading days subsequent to the forecast event period
(days +2 to +11)
30 = cumulative abnormal return - 30 trading days subsequent to the forecast event period
(days +2 to +31)
60 = cumulative abnormal return - 60 trading days subsequent to the forecast event period
(days +2 to +61)
I
Figure 2 - Plot of Cumulative Abnormal Returns
for Bad News Management Forecasts - Quintiles
Firms Stratified into Quintiles Based on the Magnitude
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= cumulative abnormal return during the -2 to +1 forecast event period
10 = cumulative abnormal return - 10 trading days subsequent to the forecast event period
(days +2 to +11)
30 = cimiulative abnormal return - 30 trading days subsequent to the forecast event period
(days +2 to +31)
60 = cumulative abnormcd return - 60 trading days subsequent to the forecast event period
(days +2 to +61)
Figure 3 - Plot of Cumulative Abnormal Returns
for Good News Management Forecasts - Quintiles
Firms Stratified into Quintiles Based on the Magnitude
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= cumulative abnormal return during the -2 to +1 forecast event period
10 = cumulative abnormal return - 10 trading days subsequent to the forecast event period
(days +2 to +11)
30 = cumulative abnormal return - 30 trading days subsequent to the forecast event period
(days +2 to +31)
60 = cumulative abnormal return - 60 trading days subsequent to the forecast event period
(days +2 to +61)
Table 1
Descriptive Statistics - Annual Earnings Forecasts
Bad News Firms (Panel A) and Good News Firms (Panel B)'







AVAR- 10 (Average Daily















Pearson Product Moment Correlations (Significance Level)
CARM AVCAR-10 AVAR-30 AVAR-60 CARE
CARM 1.00 -.26 (.02) -.27 (.02) -.37 (.01) .03 (.82)
AVAR-10 1.00 .60 (.01) .37 (.01) -.07 (.52)
AVAR-30 1.00 .66 (.01) -.14 (.21)
AVAR-60 1.00 .11 (.35)
CARE 1.00
Good news cmd bad news firms are identified
by the sign of the abnormal return at the time
of the management earnings forecast.
Table 1 - Continued
I
Descriptive Statistics - Annual Earnings Forecasts
Bad News Firms (Panel A) and Good News Firms (Panel B)
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Pearson Product Moment Correlations (Significance Level)
CARM AVAR- 10 AVAR-30 AVAR-60 CARE
CARM 1.00 .02 (.85) .03 (.78) .13 (.29) .12 (.26)
AVAR- 10 1.00 .54 (.01) .39 (.01) .13 (.22)
AVAR-30 1.00 .72 (.01) .18 (.09)




Regression Results - Annual Earnings Forecasts
Abnomicil Returns Subsequent to the Management Forecast Regressed
on the Abnormal Returns for the Management Forecast Event
Panel A - Bad News Firms





Yo Yi r2 F-Ratio
AVAR-10 -.001 (-1.18) -.150 (-2.48)" .057 6.167"
AVAR-30 -.001 (-1.74) -.082 (-2.59)' .062 6.684"
AVAR-60 -.000 (-1.29) -.076 (-3.40)' .122 11.532'
Panel B - Good News Firms





Yo Yi r2 F-Ratio
AVAR-10 -.002 (-1.99)" .017 (0.187) -.011 0.035
AVAR-30 -.001 (-1.72) .015 (0.284) -.010 0.080
AVAR-60 -.001 (-1.82) .049 (1.07) .002 1.151
AVAR - (t) is the average daily abnormal return for the t day period
subsequent to the management forecast
AVARM is the average dziily abnormal return for the 4 day period surrounding the management forecast
and denote statistical significance at the .01 and .05 levels, respectively, for a two-tailed test
Table 3
Regression Results - Annual Earnings Forecasts
Abnormal Returns at the Subsequent Earnings Announcement Regressed
on the Abnormal Returns for the Management Forecast Event
Panel A - Bad News Firms





Yo Yi r2 F-Ratio
CARE -.000 (-0.03) .026 (0.23) -.011 0.054
Panel B - Good News Firms





Yo Yi r' F-Ratio
CARE -.005 (-0.61) .254 (1.12) .003 1.258
CARE is the cumulative daily abnormal return for the 4 day period
around the subsequent earnings announcement
CARM is the cumulative daily abnormal return for the 4 day period
surrounding the management forecast
Table 4
Stock Performance Subsequent to the Management Forecast
Annual Earnings Forecasts
Portfolio Number of Firms in the
Portfolio
Average Daily Retmn t-statistic
All Finns 180 -.00015 -0.80
Bad News Firms 87 .00025 0.98
Extreme Bad News
Firms (CARM < .05)
24 .00121 2.14
Good News Firms 93 -.00052 -1.93
Extreme Good News




Descriptive Statistics - Bad News Quarteriy Earnings Forecasts




Return - Management Forecast)
-.05277 .05251
AVFE (Average Daily
Abnormal Return for the Period




bE (Forecast Error Defmed
as the Difference Between the
Actual EPS and the Forecasted







Pearson Product Moment Correlations (Significance Level)
CARM AVFE FE CARE
CARM 1.00 .12 (.33) .19 (.09) -.27 (.02)
AVFE 1.00 -.03 (.79) -.09 (.46)




Regression Results - Bad News Quarterly Earnings Forecasts
Abnormal Return for the Period Between the Forecast
and the Subsequent Earnings Announcement Regressed
on the Abnormal Return for the Management Forecast Event
AVbb = Yo + Yi AVARM + e
Coefficient Estimates
and t Statistics
Yo Yi R2 F-Ratio
-.002 (-1.22) .095 (0.99) -.000 0.978
AVFE is the average daily abnormal return during the period between the management
forecast and the subsequent earnings announcement
AVARM is the average daily abnormal return for the 4 day period
surrounding the management forecast
Table 7
Regression Results - Bad News Quarterly Earnings Forecasts
Abnormal Return for the Subsequent Earnings Announcement Regressed
on the Abnormal Return for the Management Forecast Event
CARE = Yo + Yi CARM + e
Coefficient Estimates
and t Statistics
Yo Yi r2 F-Ratio
-.002 (-0.25) -.240 (-2.41)" .059 5.812"
CARE is the cumulative daily abnormal return for the four day period
around the subsequent earnings announcement
CARM is the cumulative daily abnormal return for the 4 day period
surrounding the management forecast
• «
denotes statistical significance at the .05 level for a two-tailed test
Table 8
Regression Results - Bad News Quarterly Earnings Forecasts
Abnormal Return for the Subsequent Earnings Announcement Regressed
on the Abnormal Return for the Management Forecast Event and Forecast Errors
CARE = Yo + Yi CARM + Y2 FE + e
Coefficient Estimates
and t Statistics
Yo Yi Y^ r2 F-Ratio
-.003 (-0.35) -.291 (-2.98)' 1.216 (2.69)' .130 6.767'
CARE is the cumulative daily abnormal return for the 4 day period surrounding
the subsequent earnings amnouncement
CARM is the cumulative daily abnormal return for the 4 day period
surrounding the management forecast
FE is the surprise in the subsequent earnings announcement measured
by the difference between the actual quarterly EPS
and the forecasted EPS deflated by the pre-forecast stock price
denotes statistical significance at the .01 level for a two-tailed test
Table 9
Stock Performance Subsequent to the Management Forecast
Bad News Quarterly Earnings Forecasts
PortfoUo Nmnber of Firms in the
PortfoUo
Average Daily Return t-statistic
Bad News Firms 78 -.00085 -1.51
Extreme Bad News
Firms (CARM <
.05)
30 .00055 0.72



